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R 290245Z AUG 67
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5558
INFO CINCPAC
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 2313
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 3978

Saigon 4326
8/29/67

REVIEWED BY [illegible] 11/23/81
PORTIONS EXCISED AS INDICATED

S E C R E T SAIGON 4326

LIMDIS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

REF: A. SAIGON 2765
B. SAIGON 3416

SUBJECT: [redacted]

1. [redacted] AUGUST 28 TOLD EMBOFF THAT GENERAL THIEU HAS SOUGHT HIS ADVICE REGARDING THE MANNER IN WHICH A POLITICAL PARTY SHOULD BE SET UP TO SUPPORT THE FUTURE GOVERNMENT. [redacted]

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[redacted] SAID HE REPLIED THAT IN THE SHORT RUN IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO ORGANIZE A FRONT OF THE VARIOUS POLITICAL GROUPINGS. FOR THE LONG RUN, HOWEVER, AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT APPROACH IS REQUIRED. BOTH OVERT AND COVERT ORGANIZATIONS

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WILL BE NEEDED. THE FIRST STEP SHOULD BE THE ORGANIZATION OF MULTIPLE "UNIONS" WHICH WOULD GROUP THE POPULATION IN ORGANIZATIONS ACCORDING TO THEIR OCCUPATIONS. OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE WOULD BE THE FARMERS UNION. THESE UNIONS WOULD THEY WOULD NOT ENGAGE IN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES. THEY WOULD SEEK REAL BENEFITS FOR THEIR MEMBERS. THE CADRE OF THE UNIONS WOULD INCLUDE A NUMBER OF MEN WHO WOULD BE SECRET MEMBERS OF A POLITICAL PARTY, HOWEVER, AND IT WOULD BE THEIR DUTY TO "EDUCATE" THE RANK AND FILE OF THE UNIONS SO THAT THEY WOULD WILLINGLY SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT'S PROGRAMS AND OBJECTIVES.

2. IN BOTH THE LONG AND SHORT RUN, THE APPEAL TO THE PEOPLE IS TO BE BASED ON VOLUNTARY SUPPORT FOR A PROGRAM. THE GOVERNMENT WILL SET FORTH ITS PLANS AND ENCOURAGE ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS TO WORK WITH IT TO REALIZE THOSE PLANS WHICH THEY APPROVE.

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3. COMMENTING ON THE FORMATION OF THE TOAN VIET BLOC (SAIGON EUWWL[ ]SAID THAT THE BLOC IS NOT LINKED TO HIS CAMPAIGN EFFORT AND WILL NOT BE PART OF THIEU'S POST-ELECTION POLITICAL ORGANIZATION. ACCORDING TO[ ] THE TOAN VIET BLOC WAS PUT TOGETHER BY[ ] AT KY'S BEHEST BEFORE THE THIEU-KY MERGER. AFTER THE MERGER, KY LOST INTEREST IN THE UNDERTAKING, SINCE IT WAS TO HAVE BEEN A FRONT TO BACK HIS PRESIDENTIAL DRIVE. ASKED IF THE FRONT'S CHAIRMAN,[ ] IS NOT A THIEU SUPPORTER, [ ] SAID [ ]TS NOT RPT NOT ACTING FOR THIEU IN THE FRONT. BOTH[ ]NOW SEE THE FRONT AS A VEHICLE FOR THEIR OWN AMBITIONS AND ARE TRYING TO USE IT AS SUCH.

4. ASKED ABOUT REPORTS OF GOVERNMENT PRESSURES ON THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CIVILIAN SLATES IN HUE AND GO CONG,[ ]DID NOT SEEM MUCH CONCERNEFNM HE APPEARED TO TAKE IT AS A MATTER OF COURSE THAT THERE WILL BE CHARGES OF FRAUD AFTER THE ELECTION AS WELL AS DURING THE CAMPAIGN. HE ALSO WAS INCLUNED TO PUT THE BLAME ON KY FOR ANY ACTUAL ELECTION RIGGING. ACCORDING TO[ ] KY HAD EARLY IN THE GAME ISSUED INSTRUCTIIONS

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TO THE PROVINCE CHIEFS TO INSURE HIS VICTORY BY WHATEVER

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MEANS NECESSARY. FOLLOWING THE MERGER OF THE THIEU AND KY SLATES, GENERAL THIEU ON JUNE 30 MET WITH ALL THE PROVINCE CHIEFS (WHO WERE THEN IN SAIGON) AND SPECIFICALLY WARNED THEM AGAINST ANY ELECTION PRESSURES OF FRAUD. HOWEVER MANY PROVINCE CHIEFS HAD ALREADY PUT THE MACHINERY IN MOTION TO RIG THE ELCTION AND SOME OF THEM HAD ADOPTED AN ATTITUDE THAT THEY COULD NOT EASILY CHANGE. THERE IS ALSO THE PROBLEM OF THE NATURAL HOSTILE REAFTION OF "THE LITTLE KINGS" IN THE PROVINCES (PROVINCE CHIEFS) TO THE ACTIVITIES AND DEMANDS OF THE CIVILIAN CANDIDATES AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVES. KY'S "STUPIDITIES" (A RREFERENCE TO SOME OF KY'S OFF-THE-CUFF REMARKS TO THE PRESS) ARE ALSO PARRT OF THE PROBLEM.

5. COMMENT: (A) [ ] IDEAS ABOUT POLITICAL ORGANIZATION REFLECT HIS LONG HISTORY OF CLANDESTINE POLITICAL ACTIVITY WITH THE DAI VIET PARTY. THEY ALSO SUGGEST THAT COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONAL METHODS HAVE HAD AN EFFECT ON HIS THINKING. HE SEEMS TO HAVE LITTLE OR NO CONCEPTION OF THE ORGANIZATION OF WESTERN STYLE PARTIES OR AT LEAST DOES NOT THINK SUCH PARTIES ARE RELEVANT TO VIET NAM'S SITUATION.

(B) [ ]'S OPEN ANTIPATHY FOR KY MAKES IT CLEAR THAT THE TWO

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CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATIONS OF THIEU AND KY ARE PROBABLY STILL NOT COOPERATING EFFECTIVELY. IT ALSO BODES ILL FOR FUTURE THIEU-KY RELATIONS IF THIEU DOES INDEED SELECT [ ] FOR PRIME MINISTER OR OTHER HIGH CABINET POST. (WE HAVE NO CURRENT RELIABLE INDICATORS OF THIEU'S OWN INTENTIONS ON THIS POINT.)

(C) [ ]'S COMMENTS ON THE TOAN VIET BLOC TEND TO REINFORCE OUR IMPRESSION THAT THE BLOC WILL IN FACT BE OF LITTLE OR NO HELP TO THE THIEU-KY SLATE. [ ] COMMENT THAT HE IS TRYING TO FORM AN INDEPENDENT PARTY (SAIGON 3722) IS PROBABLY ACCURATE.

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[redacted]